Discuss the Management of Fiscal Information in Taiwan by Fiscal Sociology  by Chang, Chia-Jen & Chou, Tai-Lung
Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 850 – 855
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2012.01.053
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
          Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000 
Procedia
Engineering
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
2012 International Workshop on Information and Electronics Engineering (IWIEE) 
Discuss the Management of Fiscal Information in Taiwan by 
Fiscal Sociology 
Chia-Jen Chang, Tai-Lung Chou＊
Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Chung Yuan Christian University, Taiwan 
Associate Professor, Department of Financial and Economics Law Overseas Chinese University, Taiwan 
Abstract 
Taiwan’s fiscal transparency exists the following deficiencies--the repeating characters and functions in the 
government, the vague boundaries of government department, the differential definition of government’s debts 
between Taiwan’s regulations and international’s, inadequate disclosure of economic hypotheses and fiscal risks, and 
the contents of budget report without systematically. Furthermore, the unreasonable resources distribution between 
profession and non-professional hierarchy is the reasons of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal 
information in Taiwan. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
The definition of fiscal information is that disclose all related fiscal information systematically and 
instantly. The better government’s management has better economic and social results. Furthermore, 
fiscal information transparency is one of the conditions of well-organized government’s management. 
Therefore, we focus on the management of fiscal information transparency in Taiwan as a discussing 
theme in this article. Besides discussing the fiscal information transparency’s current conditions and 
drawbacks in Taiwan, it also explains reasons of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal 
information by fiscal sociology in order to be regarded as improvement basis for the management of 
fiscal information for the government.  
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2. The regulation of fiscal information transparency and deficiencies of fiscal information 
management in Taiwan 
2.1. OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency 
      
OECD best practices for budget transparency divides into three parts. First, list the important budget 
report and contents which should be offered by government. Second, disclose the special events including 
finance and non-finance information in the budget report. Third, make sure the quality and integrity of 
budget report.(OECD, 2002) 
(1) Listing the important budget report and contents which should be offered by government. 
     This part divides into two parts. First, planning and examination of the budget. Second, the type of the 
budget report. 
 In the budget planning and examination, we emphasize that the budget is an important political 
document of government1 which should include all the government’s revenue and expenditure in order to 
evaluate different selection policies easily. The government’s budget needs to be offered at least three 
months ago before budget year and finish the examination before the fiscal year start. Budget should 
include the integrity explanation of every revenue and expenditure planning. Moreover, it also needs to 
have medium-term perspective. 
     In the type of budget report, it needs to have Pre-budget report, Monthly reports, Mid-year report, 
Year-end report, Pre-election report, and Long-term report. 
(2) Disclosure of the special events including finance and non-finance information 
          Following special events need to be disclosed in the budget report--economic hypotheses (i.e. the 
GDP growth, the composition of GDP growth, the rate of growing, the rate of unemployment, inflation, 
and interest rate), tax expenditure, financial liabilities, financial assets, non financial assets, the obligation 
of pension payment, and contingent liabilities. 
(3) Making sure the quality and integrity of budget report 
         The same accounting policies should be used for all fiscal reports. Build the internal control system. 
Year-end report needs to be audited in accordance with the general auditing standards through supreme 
audit office and be detailed examined through the public and the congress. 
2.2 Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency
The fiscal transparency implementation guidelines of International monetary fund can divide into 
four parts. First, clarify the characters and responsibilities. Second, disclose the process of budget. Third, 
all fiscal reports should be made publicity available. Forth, make sure the integrity of information. (IMF, 
2007) 
(1) Clarifying the characters and responsibilities 
     The government departments should be distinguished clearly between other public departments and 
units of economic system. Moreover, policies and character of management should be distinguished 
clearly and disclosed publicity available in the public department. Fiscal management needs to have the 
structure of law management and executive management clearly. 
1 The definition of the government here is the same as SNA (System of Nation Accounts). Its definition includes all of 
government’s non business activities.
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(2) Disclosure of the process of budget 
     Planning the budget needs to follow the decided schedule and the clear overall definition of 
macroeconomic and fiscal target. The executive, supervision, and report of budget are necessary to have 
the clear processes. 
(3) The available publicity of information 
     The public department should offer complete information no matter fiscal activities and main fiscal 
risks are in the past, now, or planning. Fiscal information should be disclosed by the way of policy 
analysis and accountability. Government has to commit to disclosing fiscal information instantly. 
(4) Making sure the integrity of information 
     Fiscal information needs to satisfy the standard of accredited quality. Fiscal activities should be 
limited in an efficiency of internal supervision. Furthermore, fiscal information should be detailed 
examined externally. 
2.3. The deficiencies of fiscal information management in Taiwan 
      
According to the international regulations that mentioned previously, we can realize that Taiwan’s 
fiscal information transparency exists the following deficiencies. (Hsu, Jen Hui, 2005, Tsai, mei na, 2008)
     First, it is hard to classify responsibilities because of the repeating characters and functions in every 
level government. According to article of 107 to 110 of Taiwan’s constitution and article of 4 of act 
governing the allocation of government revenues and expenditures, what laws were mentioned here point 
out the repeating government’s functions. 
     Second, the vague boundaries of government department cannot present the scale of revenue and 
expenditure completely. It cannot present the scale of revenue and expenditure completely due to the 
unclear definition of government department. The annual budget based on total budget; however, special 
budget2, and part of non-profit special funds3 and social security4 excludes the total budget. 
    Third, it has a doubt of an underestimate because of the differential definition of government’s debts 
between Taiwan’s regulation and international’s. According to the article of 4 of the public debt act, the 
calculation of debts only focuses on a year more non-self-liquidation public bonds and on credit 
excluding self-liquidation and short-term debts. The debt of Profit funds and Trust funds exclude not only 
in the public debt act but in the potential liabilities5.
Forth, it is difficult to evaluate the contents of budget by the public due to inadequate disclosure of 
economic hypotheses and fiscal risks. Overestimating the tax revenue and the revenue of releasing 
government’s shares of budget present the inaccurate fiscal information. 
     Fifth, the contents of budget report, which are not in order systematically, present the fiscal 
information disorderly so that it results in the obstacle of supervising the agent’s behaviors of bureaucrat. 
2 Special budget is a unique design in Taiwan. It establishes outside the total budget in the special situation.
3 The non-profit special funds, which plan in the subsidiary unit currently, only plan a part of revenue and expenditure in the budget.
4 In Taiwan, the government, in the name of employer, burdens the social insurance fee, and the social insurance subsidies, which
were shared by the government, are listed in the government expenditure.
5 The main potential liabilities include the filling loss of insurance of government officials, labours, and farmer and potential
liabilities. Although the calculation of potential liabilities has an argument, it is necessary to disclose appropriately based on the 
international regulations.
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3 Discussing the imbalance between supply and demand of Taiwan’s fiscal information by fiscal 
sociology
We will discuss problems of fiscal information management by the research method of fiscal 
sociology in this chapter. First, introduce the basic theory of fiscal sociology. Second, understand the 
reasons of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information in Taiwan by changes of social 
structure in order to be the basis of improving problems of Taiwan’s fiscal information management. 
3.1. Discussing the problems of fiscal information management by the basis theory of fiscal 
sociology 
     Fiscal sociology is introduced by Goldscheid. He thought that the fiscal procedure should be placed as 
the center of national activities, and we should interpret fiscal problems through social and fiscal status of 
most households and their effect on the society (Goldscheid, 1967). 
     In terms of analytical methods, it deem the whole society an organism while fiscal is simply a part of 
the whole society and use class (group) analysis to examine fiscal problems. 
     In this kind of research, we have the following view points about the problems of government fiscal 
information management. 
(1) Government is a place where fiscal information resources are competing
    The government has been regarded as a place where numerous participants are pursuing different 
objectives and interactions. There is not object for the government itself, while it is just the laws and 
regulations formulated by interactions among participating individuals or organizations during the 
pursuits of respective objects. With this concept, the social structures behind fiscal and political systems 
become very important for the issues of fiscal information resources. The fiscal and political systems will 
form and confine interactions among fiscal participants, while the social structures behind can be used to 
describe how the fiscal and political systems are formed and the results of interactions among participants.  
    Participating individuals can be actors of maximization, but government is not an actor of 
maximization. It is only a stage for activities and a place for competition where actors of maximization 
can interact with each other. Fiscal phenomenon will be generated by the interactions of these participants, 
while these interactions are formed by customs and rules of the system. (Wagner, 2007：1-23) 
(2) Fiscal information resources issues is a social problem
    The economical and political aspects of fiscal information resources issues are going to interact with 
the widespread social constraints, and this kind of interaction is going to change the evaluation of utilities 
by individual. Therefore, it is better to evaluate fiscal information resources issues with its relationship 
with social factors. In other words, the conflicts of economic interests caused by production technology 
and fiscal information resources issues arising from it should depend on the political system, social 
structure, moral value and cultural tradition of the entire society. 
3.2. The reasons of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information
(1) The effect of supply and demand of fiscal information by changes of social structure change 
      
After entering the post-industrial society in 1988 and 1989, the social organizational revolution 
resulted from advanced production technologies have changed the interpersonal relationships leading to 
structural change of our country. 
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      Under post-industrial society, the unique historical heritage of Taiwan, social structure and political 
system, the change of the basic lifestyle and the transition of social organizational structure, the following 
scenarios of the trends will be presented including the enhancement of the living standard; professional 
elites (professional managers of cross-border companies and government officials) place at the top of 
social class controlling the economy of the whole society, distributing income and arranging social 
relationship; conflicts of economic interests between professional elites and the public; biased 
meritocracy brings about effects of factors (income, in particular) other than capabilities on the formation 
of professional elites; enhancement of female education and labor force participation rate; governmental 
control power over the whole economic resources appearing to be on the increase, however, declining in 
recent years; robust, but yet adequate, social security system; gradual increase in the number of persons 
receiving higher education; and steadily growing effects of professional elites from large or multi-national 
companies on the government. Of course, the most important is that Taiwan society organized and 
controlled by the increasing number of professional elites (most of whom are company managers and 
government officials).  
In other words, in the post-industrial society of Taiwan, government officials and company managers 
are the most important people who control the distribution of social resources (including fiscal 
information resources). Besides, professional hierarchies insist the ideology of free market, thereby 
leading to a laissez-faire market. Emergence of larger-sized enterprises and economic globalization has 
weakened governmental functions. All these enable government officials and company managers to 
extract social resources excessively to satisfy themselves while leaving the costs to the public (Chang, 
2008). 
(2) The imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information resources 
     Government officials, who are belonged to professional hierarchy, are suppliers of fiscal information 
resources. In the democratic society, if government officials offer detailed fiscal information, they not 
only show administrative achievement difficult but also suffer from the pressure of supervising. Therefore, 
they did not tend to disclose fiscal information actively and lack incentive to legalize the disclosure of 
fiscal information completely. In the concept of hierarchy conflict, the opaque fiscal information not only 
has the profit to give those people in the professional hierarchy secretly but achieves the purpose of the 
benefits of privatization and the costs of socialization. 
     People who need fiscal information resources are in the non-professional hierarchy. They lack fiscal 
professional skills so that they will not gather and research the fiscal information actively. In the situation 
of insufficient fiscal information transparency, it also increases the costs of gathering and researching 
fiscal information. Moreover, fiscal information resources are the public good, which includes the 
properties of non-exclusion and non-rival, and it is quite asymmetrical between the costs of acquiring 
fiscal information and obtaining profits. Non-professional hierarchy presents the insufficient demand of 
fiscal information. 
     To sum up, we can understand that the regulations of fiscal transparency have great gap between 
Taiwan’s and International’s in the post-industrial society of Taiwan by the observation of the interaction 
between professional and non-professional hierarchy. It also presents that supply of fiscal information has 
dominant position in the professional hierarchy. 
4 Conclusion and suggestions 
We have following suggestions, which are a government’s improvement basis in the management of 
fiscal information, in this article after we realize the deficiencies of information transparency in Taiwan 
and the reasons of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information resources. 
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4.1. The improvement of fiscal information transparency 
     First, distinguish characters and functions of government clearly in order to clarify responsibilities. 
Second, define the boundaries of government department clearly to present the scale of government 
revenue and expenditure completely. Third, clarify the contents of government’s debts in case 
underestimate liabilities. Forth, disclose the economic hypotheses and fiscal risks adequately in the 
budget report in order to present accurate fiscal information and avoid overestimating tax revenue and the 
revenue of releasing government’s shares. Fifth, present the contents of budget report systematically to 
decrease the costs of supervising management by the public. 
4.2. The imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information 
     The key of imbalance between supply and demand of fiscal information is the reasonable distribution 
of resources. In other words, the professional hierarchy has dominant position in the supply of fiscal 
information because of the unreasonable distribution of resources between professional and non-
professional hierarchy. 
In general, in the post-industrial society of Taiwan, conflicts of economic interests arise from 
transformation of social structure, lacking a fair regulatory system that governs the distribution of private 
properties with equal and free competition. In this way, professional elites who have dominant advantages 
exploit economic resources while leaving costs to the public. In the fiscal information, it presents the 
opaque situation. The exploitation of the public by professional elites from public and private sectors and 
the power of professional elites more than sovereignty of the state have reduced the nation’s autonomy, 
imposing restrictions on governmental functions in the whole economic and social system, which would 
be the political, economic and social problems behind fiscal information issue in Taiwan.  
Specific suggestions can be divided into four aspects. First of all, from the aspect of conflict of 
interests of economic resources, production factors such as labor, land and capital must be distributed 
reasonably. Secondly, from the aspect of conflict of interests of tax burden distribution, the fair and 
reasonable tax burden distribution is the real key for improving productivity in the post-industrial society. 
Thirdly, from the aspect of conflict of interests of government expenditures, it is possible to achieve the 
win-win situation and co-existence of economic performance and social welfare policies. Fourthly, from 
the aspect of conflict of interests of company profit distribution, the priority task is to change the 
compensation structure by shifting powers from shareholders to stakeholders, to fairly distribute 
compensation to all stakeholders, and to apply strict constraint with respect to political contributions. 
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